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L.L.M. 1971, University of Michigan; J.D. 1970, A.B. 1967, University of San Francisco.
1 See, e.g., Vidovic v. Mentor City Sch. Dist., 921 F. Supp. 2d 775 (N.D. Ohio 2013)
(cyberbullying based on national origin).
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The Internet has opened the world to the rapid
dissemination of knowledge. It has also, like every revolution,
opened the door to new crimes and torts. The law is now
responding to the new phenomenon of cyberbullying.
School bullies used to ply the hallways, schoolyards, and
playgrounds. The traditional victims of bullying knew who their
bullies were.
These traditional bullies still exist, but the Internet and
social media have created a whole new class of bullies, who, often
anonymously, from a distance, use the Internet, to electronically
torment their victims through smart phones, tablets and
personal computers, and any other forms of electronic
communications on blogs, bulletin boards, chat rooms, Twitter,
and their own websites. They post, text, hack, and instant
message. Photos are photoshopped to picture a person in a false
light. Their aim is to disparage, humiliate, or torment the victim.
Social media empowers, but also destroys. The harassment can
be felt 24/7. Occasionally the victim’s distress has been so great
that the victim has committed suicide.1
Attention is focused on teenage bullying both because it is
very common and because teenagers often have insecurity issues
as they traverse the difficult years between childhood and
adulthood with hormones kicking in. Teenagers are also well
known for sarcasm and meanness, both of which are manifested
in cyberbullying incidents. The Internet, through its various
electronic means, is an integral part of the culture and lifestyle of
today’s younger generation. They are electronically wired.
However, cyberbullying is not limited to students. Adults can
also be perpetrators and victims.
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2 For a detailed analysis of the case, see Kristopher Accardi, Is Violating an Internet
Service Provider’s Terms of Service an Example of Computer Fraud and Abuse?: An
Analytical Look at the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, Lori Drew’s Conviction and
Cyberbullying, 37 W. ST. U. L. REV. 67 (2009).
3 Steve Pokin, Megan’s Story, MEGAN MEIER FOUNDATION, http://www.meganmeier
foundation.org/megans-story.html [http://perma.cc/F9ML-Q3WK].
4 Id.
5 Id.
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Traditional bullying was physical, often with psychological
complications. Today’s cyberbullying is psychological, often with
physical complications. Traditional bullying was limited in time
and space. Today’s cyberbullying can occur at any time on a
global basis through the World Wide Web.
The prototypical case involved thirteen-year-old Megan
Meier in O’Fallon, Missouri, an upper-middle-class community
thirty-five miles northwest of St. Louis.2 Megan suffered from
depression since the third grade and was receiving medication for
attention deficit disorder and bipolar syndrome.3 She was teased
for being fat. Megan had considered suicide in the past. Her
friendship with Sarah Drew, a close friend, had recently ended.
Megan created a MySpace account. She shortly connected
with sixteen-year-old Josh Evans.4 The two bonded on the
Internet. Megan was happy.
“Josh” was not Josh, though. Indeed, he did not exist. He was
the creation of Lori Drew, Sarah’s mother, who lived four doors
away. Lori created Josh with Sarah and an eighteen-year-old
employee, Ashley Grills, to determine if Megan was “trashing”
her daughter. It evolved into a campaign to inflict pain on
Megan. Lori had posted a photo of a boy, without the boy’s
permission, as Josh.
The online relationship turned negative when “Josh” sent
this message: “I don’t know if I want to be friends with you any
longer because I heard you are not a very good friend.” The
exchanges became increasingly unfriendly. His final message
said: “You are a bad person and everybody hates you. Have a shitty
rest of your life. The world would be a better place without you.”5
Megan was devastated and committed suicide in her
bedroom the next day on October 16, 2006. This tragedy
reverberated nationally.
The prosecutor for St. Charles County, Missouri, declined to
prosecute because he could divine no crime under state law.
Instead, the United States Attorney in Los Angeles proceeded
with a felony conspiracy count and several misdemeanor charges
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against Lori Drew for alleged violations of the Computer Fraud
and Abuse Act.6
In essence, she posted on MySpace in violation of MySpace’s
terms of service. He claimed jurisdiction because MySpace, the
host, is headquartered in Beverly Hills, California. Ashley Grills
was granted immunity to testify against Lori. The criminal
charges were based on Lori Drew (1) setting up the MySpace
account under a fictitious name, (2) acquiring information about
Megan, and (3) inflicting emotional distress upon Megan. The
federal statute provides that “[w]hoever . . . intentionally
accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds authorized
access, and thereby obtains . . . information from any protected
computer” has committed a crime.7
The jury convicted Lori Drew of three misdemeanors and
deadlocked on the conspiracy charge. The federal district judge
subsequently threw out the case, holding the federal statute did
not apply.8 It was unconstitutionally vague and failed to provide
“minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement.” 9
The impact of the Megan Meier case and similar cases
prompted states to enact cyberbullying statutes.10 Irrespective of
the availability of criminal law for cyberbullying, causes of action
are available under tort law. They include defamation,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, the prima facie tort,
and state statutes, if available.
Potentially liable parties include the bully, parents of the
bully, school districts, and Internet service providers (“ISPs”).
I. STATUTES
Hate Crime Legislation
If the cyberbullying is based on the victim’s sexual identity,
race, religion, or sex, then existing hate crime statutes may
apply. For example, California’s Hate Crime Statute criminalizes
crimes committed based on the following characteristics of the
victim: disability, gender, nationality, race or ethnicity, religion,
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18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012).
Id.
8 United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 468 (C.D. Cal. 2009). The judge held the
statute was unconstitutionally vague, had notice deficiencies, and did not provide
minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement. Id. at 466–67.
9 Id. at 464.
10 One provision, in addition to general anti-bullying statutes, is to ban the creation
of an impersonation website, as was done with “Josh Evans.” See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 528.5 (West 2016).
6
7

37838-chp_19-2 Sheet No. 11 Side A

A.

37838-chp_19-2 Sheet No. 11 Side B

05/09/2016 12:16:02

Do Not Delete

362

4/23/16 9:31 AM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 19:2

sexual orientation, or association with a person or group with
those actual or perceived characteristics.11
Hate crime statutes should be a major cause of action in
cyberbullying complaints in states with these statutes.
Homophobic and racist statements seem to abound in
cyberbullying cases. Many cases involve students committing
suicide after being cyberbullied for being gay.12 The New York
case of T.E. v. Pine Bush Central School District is an example of
cyberbullying based on religion.13 Years of anti-Semitic taunting
of Jewish students were not effectively addressed by the school
district. The court held that the school’s knowledge that the
responses were inadequate can constitute deliberate indifference
for purposes of liability.14 The U.S. Supreme Court has held that
a school district’s “deliberate indifference” to a student’s sexual
harassment of another student violated Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972.15
B.

Cyberbullying Statutes

Every state, and the District of Columbia, has anti-bullying
statutes. Their breadth and depth vary greatly. Many have been
amended to include cyberbullying among the actionable
offenses.16 Questions to ask about these statutes are:
1) Are they criminal, civil, or both?
2) Do they provide a private cause of action?17

12
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CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 422.55, 422.6 (West 2016).
See, e.g., Walsh v. Tehachapi Unified Sch. Dist., 997 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1073 (E.D.
Cal. 2014).
13 T.E. v. Pine Bush Cent. Sch. Dist., 58 F. Supp. 3d 332 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (lawsuit
was brought pursuant to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and
New York’s Civil Rights Law).
14 Id. at 379; see also Zeno v. Pine Plains Cent. Sch. Dist., 702 F.3d 655, 673 (2d Cir.
2012) (racial taunting and harassment resulting in award of $1,000,000 plus fees and costs).
15 Davis ex rel LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999).
16 ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-18-514 (West 2016); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-222d(a)(2)
(West 2016); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 784.048(2), 1006.147(3)(b) (West 2016); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 20-2-751.4(a) (West 2016); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 71, § 37O(a); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 193-F:4(II)(b) (West 2016); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:37-14 (West 2016); N.Y. EDUC.
LAW § 11(7) (McKinney 2016); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 13-32-15 (West 2016); TENN. CODE
ANN. §§ 49-6-4502, 4503 (West 2016); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 11(a)(32) (West 2016).
17 For example, California expressly grants a private cause of action. CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 52.1(b) (West 2016). On the other hand, the New Hampshire statute expressly provides
that it does not create a private right of action for enforcement of the chapter against any
school district, chartered public school, or the state. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193-F:9; see
also Gauthier v. Manchester Sch. Dist., SAU #37, 123 A.3d 1016, 1019–20 (N.H. 2015)
(holding that § 193-F:9 barred a lawsuit brought against the school district for failing to
notify the parent of bullying within forty-eight hours).
11
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3) What do they cover?18
4) What are the penalties?
5) Do they only apply to schools?
6) If so, do they apply to off-campus bullying, or just
on-campus acts involving school computers, servers, and
networks?19
7) Do they apply to private schools as well as public
schools?20
8) Do they apply to the parents of minor perpetrators?
9) Do they apply to all perpetrators, minor or adult?
10) Do they grant immunity to school boards, administrators,
or employees?21
A problem with such statutes is that if written or construed
too broadly, they may interfere with the First Amendment
freedom of speech rights of the student.22 The Supreme Court
held in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District that student protests are protected by the Free Speech
Clause of the First Amendment.23 The dividing line between
protected speech and unprotected speech is unsettled, but it is
clear that threats of physical violence are not protected.24 The

05/09/2016 12:16:02
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18 For example, the North Carolina anti-bullying statute expressly includes building
a false profile or website, posing as a minor in an internet chat room, email or instant
messaging, or following a minor online. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-458.1 (West 2016).
A commonality in the statutes is to reference cyberbullying in terms of “electronic
communications devices.” See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 653.2(b) (West 2016). For an
analysis of California’s approach to cyberbullying, see generally Atticus N. Wegman,
Cyberbullying and California’s Response, 47 U.S.F. L. REV. 737 (2013).
19 For example, New Hampshire’s anti-bullying act applies to both on-campus and
off-campus “if the conduct interferes with a pupil’s educational opportunities or
substantially disrupts the orderly operations of the school or school-sponsored activity or
event.” N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193-F:4(I)(b); see also TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-4502(a)(3)(B)
(West 2016).
20 California permits a private postsecondary educational institution to adopt rules
and regulations designed to prevent hate violence. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 94367(f) (West 2016).
21 For example, Tennessee’s statute grants immunity to school employees who
promptly report acts of harassment, intimidation, bullying, or cyberbullying to the
appropriate official in accordance with the procedures set forth in the school district
policies. TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-4505(c) (West 2016); see also CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 10-222l(a) (West 2016).
22 See, e.g., People v. Marquan M., 19 N.E.3d 480, 486 (N.Y. 2014).
23 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (holding
students wearing black armbands to protest the Vietnam War were protected under the
First Amendment).
24 For detailed analysis of the First Amendment issue, see generally Matthew Fenn,
A Web of Liability: Does New Cyberbullying Legislation Put Public Schools in a Sticky
Situation?, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2729 (2013); Daniel Marcus-Toll, Tinker Gone Viral: Diverging
Threshold Tests for Analyzing School of Regulation of Off-Campus Digital Student Speech,
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Court held that prohibitions on expressive conduct could be
upheld if the conduct “would ‘materially and substantially
interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the
operation of the school.’”25
In United States v. Alvarez,26 the Supreme Court noted that
the First Amendment does not protect fighting words, true
threats, incitements, obscenity,27 child pornography, fraud,
defamation, or statements integral to criminal conduct.28
Websites for the purchase of illegal drugs are not protected.29 A
posting about killing a teacher should not be protected.30
On the other hand, the parody of a school principal should be
protected speech.31 Similarly, bad reviews and student comments on
a professor’s teaching are protected speech.32 The embarrassment
of administrators is not a ground for banning student non-school
sponsored material.33
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82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3395 (2014); Renee L. Servance, Cyberbullying, Cyber-Harassment
and the Conflict Between Schools and the First Amendment, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 1213.
25 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509 (citing Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)).
26 United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012).
27 Id.; see also Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986) (holding
the school district was able to prohibit and punish lewd and vulgar speech or behavior).
28 Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2544.
29 Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 397 (2007).
30 Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2007).
31 Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 496 F. Supp. 2d 587 (W.D. Pa. 2007); see also
Beverly v. Watson, 78 F. Supp. 3d 717 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (attempt by administration to shut
down an off-campus professor blog critical of the administration).
32 Schmisky v. Higgins, 2014 WL 1710962 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2014).
33 Burch v. Barker, 861 F.2d 1149 (9th Cir. 1988).
34 Morse, 551 U.S. at 410.
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II. ON-CAMPUS OR OFF-CAMPUS CYBERBULLYING
We start with the premise that school boards have more
power to regulate on-campus speech and conduct than off-campus
speech and conduct. The issue remains open as to the extent of
the jurisdiction of school boards to punish off-campus cyberbullying.
Much of the traditional schoolyard bullying occurred on school
grounds. Today, anyone with an electronic connection anywhere
in the world can initiate a cyberbullying attack. Anyone else in
the world can join in if the website used to incite the attack is an
open one. The communications may be through an off-campus
web host. The only “on-campus” link might be that a few students,
teachers, or administrators will see it and discuss it at school.
The Supreme Court held in Morse v. Frederick34 that the
school could act against on-campus vulgar and lewd speech.
However, Justice Brennan, in his concurring opinion in Bethel
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Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 688 (1986).
Morse, 551 U.S. at 393.
37 Id. at 405.
38 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969).
39 Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir. 2011).
40 Id. at 573–74; see also Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2008); Boucher v. Sch.
Bd. of Sch. Dist. of Greenfield, 134 F.3d 821 (7th Cir. 1998).
41 Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379 (5th Cir. 2015).
42 Id.
35
36
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School District v. Fraser, wrote that the situation would be
different with off-campus speech: “If respondent had given the
same speech outside of the school environment, he could not have
been penalized simply because government officials considered
his language to be inappropriate.”35 Chief Justice Roberts in his
majority opinion in Morse v. Frederick36 echoed Justice Brennan’s
concurrence in Fraser: “Had Fraser delivered the same speech
in a public forum outside the school context, it would have
been protected.” 37
State and federal courts have wrestled with the defining line
between the ability of school boards to discipline off-campus web
postings that reflect poorly on some students, teachers, or
administrators. A consensus seems to be evolving around the
issue of whether or not the act had a substantial interference
(substantial disruption) with school discipline or the rights of
others. Looking to language in Tinker, “conduct by the student,
in class or out of it, which for any reason . . . materially disrupts
classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the
rights of others is, of course, not immunized . . . .”38
Courts have upheld disciplinary actions against students
whose off-campus postings carried over to the school campus,
such as in Kowalski v. Berkeley County School.39 The student’s
off-campus website singled out a specific student for harassing,
bullying, and intimidation, tagging her with herpes.
Postings that interfere with the work and discipline of the
school, that create a substantial disorder and disruption in the
school, that interfere with students’ rights to be secure and left
alone, are subject to disciplinary action by the school.40
An off-campus rap entitled “PSK The Truth Needs to Be
Told,” which named two teachers and described violent acts
against them, was not protected speech.41 The rap was directed
at the school and contained threats of physical violence.42
Yet, off-campus electronic postings are not necessarily
subject to school discipline, even if made directly toward students
at the school. For example, a student followed up on a creative
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writing assignment the previous year of writing your own
obituary by posting two mock obituaries of students at the school.
The page said the site was not sponsored by the school and was
for entertainment only. The student also asked readers to submit
suggestions on who should die next, i.e. receive a mock obituary.
The media called it a “hit list,” but it was clear that no
student at school felt threatened by it. The court overturned the
student’s discipline and held the posting was protected speech.43
An off-campus tweet not posing a risk to the school was
protected by the First Amendment.44 Off-campus postings, that
are neither school-sponsored nor at a school-sponsored event, and
which do not present a substantial disruption at the school, are
not subject to school discipline.45

43

46
47
48

Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist. No. 415, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (W.D. Wash. 2000).
Sagehorn v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 728, 2015 WL 4744482 (D. Minn. Aug. 11, 2015).
J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 933 (3d Cir. 2011).
CAL. CIV. CODE § 45 (West 2016).
Khawar v. Globe Int’l, Inc., 965 P.2d 696, 704 (Cal. 1998).
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2012); see also Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510 (Cal. 2006).
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III. DEFAMATION
Defamation, usually libel since the defamation is by written
means, is generally defined as the publication of a false
statement that holds one up to hatred, contempt, or ridicule, or
causes one to be shunned or avoided. The publication need only
be to one person.
Defamation would clearly apply in cyberbullying cases where
the perpetrator is publishing a defamatory statement about the
victim. The false statement constitutes libel since the electronic
statement is in written form.
California defines libel as “a false and unprivileged publication
by words . . . which expose any person to hatred, contempt, ridicule
or obloquy, or which causes him to be shunned or avoided, or has
a tendency to injure him in his occupation.”46
Anyone publishing or republishing47 the defamatory remark
can be liable as a publisher. That would seemingly include the
ISP. However, Congress in the Communications Decency Act of
1996, exempted ISPs from liability as publishers in Section 230,
commonly referred to as the Internet Freedom and Family
Empowerment Act. The section provides: “[n]o provider or user of
an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher
or speaker of any information provided by another information
content provider.”48 Courts have held the immunity applies
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even if the third party submitted a false profile 49 or if the ISP
acted negligently.50
Under the privilege of fair comment, the common law
generally protects the right to express an opinion, such as
negative reviews or statements, but not false facts about movies,
books, plays, and politicians, not to mention administrators
and teachers.51
IV. INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress is a
well-developed cause of action for a young tort that traces back to
the mid-twentieth century.52 The Restatement (Third) of Torts
provides: “[a]n actor who by extreme and outrageous conduct
intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional harm to
another is subject to liability for that emotional harm and, if the
emotional harm causes bodily harm, also for the bodily harm.”53
California adopted the tort in State Rubbish Collectors
Association v. Siliznoff,54 which involved physical threats, and
then extended it to racial and ethnic insults in Alcorn v. Anbro
Engineering, Inc.55 The next, logical step will be to formally
extend it to cyberbullying.

50
51
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Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2003).
Green v. America Online (AOL), 318 F.3d 465 (3d Cir. 2003).
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 (AM. LAW INST. 1977); see also Baker
v. L.A. Herald Exam’r, 721 P.2d 87 (Cal. 1986); Schimsky v. Higgins, 2014 WL 1710962
(Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2014) (protecting inconsistently bad evaluations and reviews of
adjunct professor).
52 For one of the most famous cases exemplifying this cause of action, see State
Rubbish Collectors Ass’n v. Siliznoff, 240 P.2d 282 (Cal. 1952).
53 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 46 (AM. LAW INST. 2012).
54 State Rubbish Collectors Ass’n, 240 P.2d at 282.
55 Alcorn v. Anbro Eng’g, Inc., 468 P.2d 216 (Cal. 1970).
56 For a history of the prima facie tort, see Kenneth J. Vandevelde, A History of
Prima Facie Tort: The Origins of a General Theory of Intentional Tort, 19 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 447 (1990). See Morris D. Forkosch, An Analysis of the “Prima Facie Tort” Cause of
49
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V. PRIMA FACIE TORT
The early common law was very strict in its pleadings. If a
cause of action did not fit into one of the established writs, then it
could not proceed. Thus, an intentional, wrongful act, no matter
how egregious, which did not fit into such traditional writs as
assault, battery, false imprisonment, trespass to chattels, conversion,
or trespass, would fail.
The American common law therefore developed the catch-all
“prima facie” tort,56 based on dicta by Lord Bowen in the 1889
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British case of Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor, Gow & Co.57
He wrote: “[I]ntentionally to do that which is calculated in the
ordinary course of events to damage, and which does, in fact,
damage another in that other person’s property or trade, is
actionable if done without just cause or excuse.”58
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes advanced the prima facie tort
in the 1904 Supreme Court case of Aikens v. Wisconsin: “It has
been considered that, prima facie, the intentional infliction of
temporal damage is a cause of action, which, as a matter of
substantive law, whatever may be the form of pleading,
requires a justification if the defendant is to escape.”59 He cited
Mogul Steamship and the earlier Massachusetts decision in
Walker v. Cronin. 60
The prima facie tort remains underutilized and
underrecognized. Under the prima facie tort, anyone who
intentionally causes injury to another shall be liable unless the
acts were privileged. The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides:
One who intentionally causes injury to another is subject to liability to
the other for that injury, if his conduct is generally culpable and not
justifiable under the circumstances. This liability may be imposed
although the actor’s conduct does not come within a traditional
category of tort liability.61

The prima facie tort has not been uniformly adopted in the
United States. Jurisdictions are split on establishing the prima
facie tort cause of action,62 with many jurisdictions not
recognizing it.63 Others only allow the prima facie tort to proceed
if no other cause of action exists.64
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Action, 42 CORNELL L. REV. 465 (1957); Note, The Prima Facie Tort Doctrine, 52 COLUM.
L. REV. 503 (1952). In New York, see Note, The Prima Facie Tort Doctrine in New York—
Another Writ?, 42 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 530 (1968).
57 Mogul S.S. Co. v. McGregor, Gow & Co., 23 QBD 598 (1889), aff’d. [1892] App.
Cas. 25 (HL).
58 Id. at 613.
59 Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194, 204 (1904)
60 Walker v. Cronin, 107 Mass. 555, 562 (1871) (“The intentional causing of such loss
to another, without justifiable cause, and with the malicious purpose to inflict it, is of
itself a wrong.”).
61 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 870 (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
62 States that have recognized the prima facie tort include: California (Cervantez v. J.C.
Penney Co., 156 Cal. Rptr. 198, 206 (Cal. 1979)); Delaware (Kaye v. Pantone, Inc., 395
A.2d 369, 373 (Del. Ch. 1978)); Missouri (Porter v. Crawford & Co., 611 S.W.2d 265, 268
(Mo. Ct. App. 1980)); and New York (Advance Music Corp. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 70 N.E.2d
401, 403 (N.Y. 1946)).
63 These jurisdictions include: District of Columbia (Nix v. Hoke, 139 F. Supp. 2d
125, 132 (D. D.C. 2001)); Florida (Whitney Info. Network, Inc. v. Gagnon, 353 F. Supp. 2d
1208, 1213 (M.D. Fla. 2005)); Ohio (Phung v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 532 N.E.2d 195, 200
(Ohio App. 1988)); Pennsylvania (Hughes v. Halbach & Braun Indus., Ltd., 10 F. Supp. 2d
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Cyberbullying should fall into the prima facie category in
jurisdictions which accept the tort because of the intentional
outrageousness of the act lacking justification. The intent is
clearly to injure the victim.
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491, 499 (W.D. Pa. 1998)); Texas (Perdue v. J.C. Penney Co., 470 F. Supp. 1234, 1239
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) (applying Texas law)); and Virginia (Unlimited Screw Prod., Inc. v. Malm,
781 F. Supp. 1121, 1130 (E.D. Va. 1991)).
64 See, e.g., Richard A. Pulaski Const. Co. v. Air Frame Hangers, Inc., 950 A.2d 868,
876 (N.J. 2008) (New Jersey); see also Long v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 330 N.Y.S.2d 664, 668
(N.Y. App. Div. 1972) (New York).
65 D.C. v. R.R., 106 Cal. Rptr. 3d 399 (Ct. App. 2010).
66 CAL. PENAL CODE § 653.2 (West 2016).
67 D.C., 106 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 404–05.
68 Id. at 407–08.
69 Id. at 405. A more detailed version of the comments is found in the dissent. Id. at
440–45.
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VI. CALIFORNIA
Very few civil cyberbullying cases have worked their way
through the judicial system. A California case, D.C. v. R.R.,65 is
not a good auger for the future even though California makes it
illegal to use any electronic communication with intent to instill
fear or harass another person.66
Daniel Caplin, a fifteen-year-old student at the private
Harvard-Westlake School in Los Angeles, was an aspiring actor
and singer with several gigs and an album coming out. He
opened a website to promote his activities and allowed members
of the public to post comments on a “guest book.”67 The responses
were not always what he expected.
The favorable comments were accompanied by scurrilous
comments, including homophobic slurs and threats of violence,
which are all too common in cyberbullying scenarios. Thirty-four
posts were viewed as offensive with six perceived as death
threats. Twenty-three asserted Daniel was gay, some using the
word “faggot.”68 One student wrote: “I want to rip out your
fucking heart and feed it to you . . . I’ve . . . wanted to kill you. If I
ever see you I’m . . . going to pound your head in with an ice pick.
Fuck you, you dick-riding penis lover. I hope you burn in hell.”69
Daniel’s father, Lee Caplin, contacted Harvard-Westlake and
the Los Angeles Police Department, which in turn contacted the
FBI. The LAPD viewed the threats as credible and suggested the
Caplins move. They moved to Northern California, placed Daniel
in a school there, and the father commuted back and forth
between Northern California and his business in Los Angeles.
The Harvard-Westlake student newspaper published two articles
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70 The Assistant District Attorney assigned to the case filed a declaration “stating
that, based on the evidence, the district attorney’s office declined to prosecute any of the
students who had posted messages on D.C.’s Web site.” Id. at 412.
71 D.C. v. Harvard-Westlake Sch., 98 Cal. Rptr. 3d 300, 304 (Ct. App. 2009).
72 CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 51.7, 52.1 (West 2016).
73 D.C., 106 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 406.
74 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16 (West 2016).
75 Caplin v. Harvard-Westlake Sch., No. BC 332406, 2008 WL 4721598, at *2 (Cal.
Super. Ct. Mar. 12, 2008).
76 CIV. PROC. § 425.16.
77 CIV. § 1714.1.
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about the case, one of which disclosed the Caplins’ new residence
and Daniel’s school. Harvard-Westlake did not suspend or expel
the offending students. The Los Angeles District Attorney
exercised prosecutorial discretion and declined to prosecute.70
Daniel and his parents, Lee and Gina Caplin, filed suit
against six students and their parents, Harvard-Westlake School,
the school’s Board of Directors, and three school employees. The
original complaint contained eleven causes of action, including:
negligence, assault upon another with death threats and hate
crimes, invasion of privacy, defamation, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress,
fraud in the inducement of a contract, and various conspiracy
counts attached to these claims.71 A statutory violation of
California’s Hate Crime Laws72 was added later.73
Defendants sought to dismiss the case on several grounds,
including: violation of California’s anti-SLAPP suit statute,74
protected speech pursuant to the First Amendment, and on a
factual basis, the statement was meant as a joke, intended as
“jocular humor.”75 The anti-SLAPP statute was enacted to protect
public participants, especially opponents, of projects against
lawsuits by the proposal’s developers and supporters with the
intent of muzzling the opponents. The statute is broadly written: “A
cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person
in furtherance of the right of petition or free speech under the
United States Constitution or California Constitution in
connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion
to strike . . . .”76
The result is that the statute is often raised by other
defendants, such as cyberbullies who claim both First
Amendment protections and the statute as legal defenses. They
claim that their views represent a matter of public importance.
The vicarious liability of the parents, if proven, is limited by
statute to $25,000.77 The case against the parents of the alleged
cyberbully in Caplin v. Harvard-Westlake was subsequently
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dismissed.78 Other courts have reiterated the common law view
that parents are not vicariously liable for the acts of their
children, but can be liable for negligence in failing to supervise or
control their children. For example, negligence could lie in not
removing the offending page after learning of its existence.79
Harvard-Westlake invoked the mandatory arbitration
provision in the school’s enrollment contract. The provision
provided the prevailing party would receive attorney fees and
costs. The arbitrator held for Harvard-Westlake and awarded the
school $521,227.68 from the parents. The California Court of
Appeals held that only the prevailing plaintiff can recover
attorney fees under California’s Hate Crime Statute.80 These fees
were therefore improperly awarded and the case was remanded
for reconsideration.81 The court on remand awarded $208,928.34
in attorney fees and costs against the plaintiff parents, Lee and
Gina Caplin, with the statutory rate of interest added to it.82
California has since enacted a statute that now purports to
bar this type of clause in cases similar to that in D.C.
v. Harvard-Westlake. 83
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78 Caplin v. Harvard-Westlake Sch., No. BC 332406, 2011 WL 10653443, at *1 (Cal.
Super. Ct. Nov. 1, 2011).
79 See Boston v. Athearn, 764 S.E.2d 582, 587 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014).
80 D.C. v. Harvard-Westlake Sch., 98 Cal. Rptr. 3d 300, 323 (Ct. App. 2009).
81 Id. at 325.
82 Caplin, 2011 WL 10653443, at *1.
83 CAL. CIV. CODE § 51.7 (West 2016).
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CONCLUSION
We are still in the early days of the computer revolution.
Social media has transformed the old schoolyard bully into the
cyberbully. The schoolyard bully’s anti-social behavior was
usually limited in time and space. The victim could usually
identify the bully.
Today’s cyberbully can anonymously attack anyone anytime
from anywhere with an internet connection. The resulting
psychological injury may be severe in vulnerable victims,
sometimes leading to suicides. The cyberbullies, often teenagers,
can be especially malevolent, clever, and creative in their actions,
ranging from threats to defamation. Teenagers who could never
be a physical bully can easily become a cyberbully.
The law, both statutory and common, is responding to the
new phenomenon of cyberbullying. However, an overall
consensus has yet to emerge. In addition, resolution may depend
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upon a United States Supreme Court decision because of an
ambiguity in students’ rights of free speech from an off-campus
source. Prosecutors are often unwilling to bring criminal charges
because of a lack of clarity in the criminal law.
Legislatures are mandating that school districts adopt
anti-bullying policies and procedures. Less than half, though,
have to adopt cyberbullying measures.
A larger gap exists in that many statutes only apply to public
schools. Courts will thereby have to apply, with the flexibility of
the common law, existing rules in defamation, emotional distress,
and the prima facie tort to the new cyber tort.
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